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GENDER MATTERS:  TEACHING A REASONABLE WOMAN 
STANDARD IN PERSONAL INJURY LAW* 
MARGO SCHLANGER** 
“Reasonable care” is, of course, a concept central to any torts class.  But 
what is it?  One very standard doctrinal move is to conceptualize reasonable 
care as that care shown by a “reasonable person” under like circumstances.  
The next step, logically, is to visualize this reasonable person.  Visualization 
requires some important choices.  For example, is the reasonable person old or 
young?  Disabled or not?  These are two questions that all the casebooks I have 
consulted discuss.1  But, oddly, no casebook of which I am aware deals with 
the trait that nearly invariably figures in our description of people: sex. 
If the casebooks are silent, however, the cases and commentary are not.  
Judicial opinions frequently used to refer to the “reasonable man” rather than 
the reasonable person.  As stated in the earliest, and one of the most frequently 
quoted, such articulation, “[n]egligence is the omission to do something which 
a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate 
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent 
and reasonable man would not do.”2  In a famous passage, in 1933, Lord Judge 
 
* © 2001 Margo Schlanger. 
** Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School.  I refer readers interested in a lengthier analysis of 
the subject discussed here, as well as two other sets of personal injury cases in which courts 
discussed gender-related expectations, to Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law 
Courts, 1860-1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (1998).  Many thanks to my colleagues Lani 
Guinier, Martha Minow, Robert Pritchard and (as always) Sam Bagenstos for helpful comments.  
Any errors are mine. 
 1. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 281-302 (2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 155-77 (7th ed. 2000); MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. 
RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 44-48 (6th ed. 1996); ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT 
AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 176-95 (3d ed. 1998). 
 2. Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. 1856) (Alderson, 
B.).  I do not mean to overstate this point, however.  Judicial opinions often were phrased in 
gender-neutral language, even in the early days of tort law.  In Blyth itself, the very case in which 
the precise expression “reasonable man” seems to have appeared for the first time, Baron 
Alderson also used the words “reasonable person,” stating that “[t]he defendants might have been 
liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person would 
have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.”  Id. at 
1049.  Courts talked about “persons” both when women were involved, see, for example, Bigelow 
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Greer described as well as named the reasonable man in explicitly masculine 
phrases; he was “‘the man who takes the magazines at home and in the evening 
pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.’”3  Feminism has not let the 
masculine origin of the reasonable person go unremarked.  Feminist scholars 
have argued that tort law used to evaluate care against a standard that was not 
just linguistically but substantively masculine—that the reasonable man is the 
mascot of tort law’s oppression and exclusion of women.4  The unremedied 
effects, some have argued, continue in place.  For example, Leslie Bender 
writes: 
It was originally believed that the “reasonable man” standard was gender 
neutral.  “Man” was used in the generic sense to mean person or human being. 
But man is not generic except to other men. . . . As our social sensitivity to 
sexism developed, our legal institutions did the “gentlemanly” thing and 
substituted the neutral word “person” for “man.” . . . Although tort law 
protected itself from allegations of sexism, it did not change its content and 
character.5 
In my torts class, I spend considerable time on gender issues in a variety of 
contexts.  The interaction of gender norms and the law seems to me key to any 
adequate presentation of sexual harassment, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress,6 and damages;7 gender is relevant to other topics as well.8  The first 
and most sustained discussion of gender difference and what the law might do 
about it occurs quite early in the class, when I ask my students to consider 
 
v. Rutland, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 247, 248 (1849), and when men were involved, see, for example, 
Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1877). 
 3. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224 (1933) (quoting unnamed 
“American author”). 
 4. For citations to works that make this point about the reasonable man standard, see Margo 
Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 
81, n.15 (1998) [hereinafter Schlanger, Injured Women]. 
 5. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 
22 (1988). 
 6. See Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A 
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm 
to Another: A Feminist Critique, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 391 (1996). 
 7. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a 
Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 51-54 (1989); Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: 
The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 (1997); Thomas Koenig & 
Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(1995). 
 8. For example, I teach a class on imputed negligence and marriage.  For development of 
the topic, see Schlanger, Injured Women, supra note 4, at 87-102.  (The class material is available 
at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/coursepages/schlanger/husband_wife.pdf.)  I 
also discuss gender when I teach assumption of the risk and risk aversion.  See, e.g., Diane Klein, 
Distorted Reasoning: Gender, Risk-Aversion and Negligence Law, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 629 
(1997). 
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what tort law might look like if it treated a defendant’s or plaintiff’s gender as 
relevant to jury assessment of due care.  What, that is, would it mean for the 
law to talk about reasonable women as well as men?9  To prepare, my students 
read a series of cases I have collected and edited that arose out of injuries to 
women.10  Each of these cases, which span the years 1860 to 1899, is premised 
on an express or implied assessment by one or both the parties, or by a judge, 
that men and women are often different in some way causally relevant to the 
accident at issue. 
I try to vary my pedagogical approach in Torts, to accommodate students’ 
different learning styles.11  My teaching plan for this class session is, as in 
many though not all classes, to engage the students in a participatory (though 
usually quite controlled) close analysis of the appellate cases, beginning with 
socratic questioning about the holdings and logic of the opinions.  I then widen 
the frame of inquiry, for example encouraging the class to think about the 
social and political norms and institutions relevant to the legal question under 
discussion and about which institutional features matter. 
Although I do not assign (or even explicitly discuss) theoretical analyses of 
equality, difference, and subordination, my own understanding of these cases 
grows out of the generative work by feminists and others.  For many scholars 
and activists, a central question for legal feminist theory is whether women’s 
equality and welfare is best fostered by insisting on adherence to universal 
legal standards or on recognition and even privileging of women’s difference 
from men.12  And Martha Minow has generalized the point persuasively, 
writing of the “dilemma of difference.”  As she explains, “[t]he stigma of 
difference may be recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it. . . . The 
 
 9. Cf. Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the 
“Reasonable Man,” 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 311, 315 (1977) (“[E]xhaustive research has unearthed no 
common-law reference to a ‘reasonable woman.’”); ALAN PATRICK HERBERT, Fardell v. Potts, in 
MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 18-20 (1927) (satirical “case” premised on judicial 
finding that “[i]n all the mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no 
single mention of a reasonable woman . . . for the simple reason that no such being is 
contemplated by the law; that legally at least there is no reasonable woman”). 
 10. For anyone interested, the reading assignment is available at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/Academic_Affairs/coursepages/schlanger/reasonable_women.pdf. 
 11. Cf. Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experiences at One Ivy League 
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45-47 (1994) (discussing gendered variation in student 
response to traditional socratic first-year law teaching); id. at 93-98 (recommending diversity of 
instructional approaches). 
 12. See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, The Uses of 
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 34 (1988) (“[O]ne of the hotly 
contested issues among contemporary (U.S.) feminists is the equality-versus-difference debate.”).  
Joan Williams interestingly discusses the debate in her piece, Do Women Need Special 
Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality? 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279 (1998).  See also 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne 
Kennedy eds., 1991) (collecting many of the important articles on the subject). 
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problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating members of 
minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the two 
groups differently.”13  It is the dilemma of difference that makes these 
nineteenth-century personal injury cases difficult and interesting to talk about. 
A. Issue 1: Whether to make allowance for women’s bad driving. 
I will start here with a brief summary of one of the earlier cases, Daniels v. 
Clegg.14  While the plaintiff’s twenty-year-old daughter was driving his horse 
and buggy (“in great haste to find her father on account of the dangerous 
illness of a sister”15), she was involved in an accident with the defendant, who 
was driving a wagon on the left side of the road and failed to yield any portion 
of the road to her.  The issue on appeal from a plaintiff’s verdict was the jury 
instruction about the daughter’s alleged contributory negligence.  The Supreme 
Court of Michigan held that the trial court correctly charged the jury that 
“in deciding whether the plaintiff’s daughter exercised ordinary care in driving 
the horse, or was guilty of [contributory] negligence, the jury should consider 
the age of the daughter, and the fact that she was a woman; . . .” [that is,] “she 
would not be guilty of negligence if she used that degree of care that a person 
of her age and sex would ordinarily use.”16 
The trial court committed no error, the Supreme Court continued, in refusing to 
charge that “for the purpose of this case, the daughter should be held to the 
same degree of care and skill that would be required of the plaintiff himself, 
had he been driving at the time of the collision.”17 
I join with the Daniels case another one with a similar posture, Tucker v. 
Town of Henniker,18 in which the plaintiff, accompanied by another woman, 
was driving a horse and carriage when, they alleged, tortious road conditions 
caused them to have an accident.  The trial court instructed the jury that the 
plaintiff “‘was bound to exercise . . . such care, skill and prudence as ordinary 
persons like herself were accustomed to exercise in managing their horses.’”19  
The New Hampshire Supreme Court found this instruction erroneous, 
commenting: 
In a country where women are accustomed, as among us, to drive horses and 
carriages, there can be no doubt that the degree of care, skill and prudence 
required of a woman in managing her horse would be precisely that degree of 
 
 13. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990). 
 14. 28 Mich. 32 (1873). 
 15. Id. at 34. 
 16. Id. at 40 (quoting the trial court). 
 17. Id. 
 18. 41 N.H. 317 (1860). 
 19. Id. at 319 (quoting the trial court). 
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care, skill and prudence which persons of common prudence, or mankind in 
general, usually exercise, or are accustomed to exert, in the management of the 
horses driven by them.  Now the language of the charge in the court below 
might be construed as making the average care, skill and prudence of women 
in managing horses, instead of the average care, skill and prudence of mankind 
generally, including all those accustomed to manage horses, whether men or 
women, boys or girls, the standard by which to determine whether or not the 
plaintiff had been guilty of any unskillfulness or want of care in the 
management of her horse at the time of the accident.  As it may be doubtful 
whether this average would be higher or lower than that of mankind in general, 
and as it is not the precise standard prescribed by the law, and the jury may 
possibly have been misled by it, the instructions must be held to have been 
erroneous on this point.20 
The Daniels and Tucker cases introduce concretely the idea of gendered 
standards of care, highlighting that reference to a person’s sex in defining the 
care required of her necessarily rests on some presumption of sex difference—
here, that women are typically worse wagon drivers than men are.  I ask the 
students to accept for the sake of argument that, on average but not for all 
people, this difference was, in the mid-nineteenth century, real.  I also ask them 
to assume that equality of men and women is an important (if not necessarily 
trumping) value.  This last assumption is important for teaching purposes, 
because I am trying to focus the conversation on the complex conceptual and 
implementation problems raised by a norm of equality—not on the issue of 
whether sex equality is politically appropriate on its own merits.  I then lead 
the students to set out several doctrinal options available within tort law to deal 
with perceived sex difference: women could be held to the masculine (and 
higher) standard, as the defendant requested in Daniels; women and men alike 
could be held to some kind of universalized standard (as the court requires in 
Tucker); women could be held to a (lower) feminine standard.21 
The idea is for the class discussion to develop the implications of each 
option.  I elicit from some students the point that holding women to a 
masculine standard seems unfairly punitive.  Others counter that perhaps the 
higher standard pushes women to eliminate their driving deficit.  If, however, 
the difference is not something easily eliminated—because, for example, 
wagon-driving skill depends on hand or upper body strength—the result of a 
masculine standard is a disincentive for women to drive.  Applying a 
masculine standard, then, would quite literally enforce women’s confinement 
 
 20. Id. at 321-22. 
 21. Another analytic option that was, however, not taken seriously by courts and is not 
otherwise discussed here, is that it could be contributory negligence as a matter of law (or 
rebuttable presumption, or permissive inference) for women to drive.  See Cobb v. Standish, 14 
Me. 198 (1837) (rejecting such an approach). 
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to a non-public domestic sphere.22  With some guidance, the topic then opens 
up into debate about the potential for either tort judgments or judicial 
reasoning to influence behavior.  I encourage the students to move from 
speculation about the possible incentive effects of tort judgments to normative 
discussion of whether law should simply reflect, or rather mold, a community’s 
ideological commitments. 
Those students who think it appropriate for common law rules to shape 
society typically argue that holding men and women alike to a universalized 
standard has the advantage of not reifying gender inequality and perhaps even 
of making perceived feminine driving inadequacies less salient to observers of 
court cases.  But they are forced by others to concede that the “universal” 
standard on which the Tucker court insists has a disparate impact on women, 
and is at least problematic for this reason.  I further challenge those who are 
moved by economic arguments, asking whether it is socially optimal for the 
law to require women to live up to a masculine standard, given that achieving a 
certain level of safety is typically more “costly” (if not monetarily than in 
terms of effort) for women than for men.23 
Other students advocate for the result in Daniels, arguing that holding 
women to an expressly feminine standard serves women’s interests by 
allowing women to win more tort cases and (putting aside special pleading) by 
refusing to “blame the victims” of the unfortunate social fact of gendered 
limitations. 
Tucker raises another topic as well—the complex interaction of substance 
and language. As I have noted in an earlier article, the Tucker court easily 
could have construed the word “person” in the jury instruction to communicate 
gender neutrality and the irrelevance of the plaintiff’s sex.  Instead, the opinion 
concludes that the phrase “ordinary persons like herself” erroneously called 
upon the jury consider the sex of the plaintiff.  It is hard to imagine a 
 
 22. See, e.g., MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 113-19, 252 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the “separate spheres” construct in its initial, 
antebellum flowering, and in the early twentieth century); Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, 
Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1988). 
 23. Cf. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 74 (1987) (arguing that 
efficiency requires that “where it is simple for courts to determine differences in the cost of taking 
care among parties, levels of due care should be individualized.  If courts can distinguish the 
young and able-bodied person who can readily clear a sidewalk of ice from the elderly person 
who cannot, the first but not the second should be found negligent for failing to clear ice.”); 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 124-
31 (1987) (making a similar point, and arguing with reference to age and disability that tort law in 
large part conforms with this economic insight).  Of course, to the extent that the law requires less 
risk-taking (or more care) than is efficient, informed persons optimize their own welfare by taking 
a risk (or failing to take a precaution) notwithstanding that they will be uncompensated if harm 
materializes.  Cf. SHAVELL, supra, at 5-32 (comparing strict liability and negligence); LANDES & 
POSNER, supra, at 54-82 (same). 
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analogous cavil with an instruction referring to “ordinary persons like 
himself”—the point being that the interpretation of the language of gender is 
necessarily molded by gender ideology.  If femaleness is the “marked,” 
abnormal state, then any reference to femaleness is likely to connote gender 
specificity.  Since maleness is the “unmarked,” normal state, reference to 
maleness does not necessarily have the symmetrical effect.24  I develop these 
concepts throughout the class. 
B. Issue 2: Whether to require women to exercise extra care in light of their 
fragility. 
In Daniels and Tucker it was the injured woman plaintiff who purportedly 
benefited from the jury’s consideration of her sex.  But the valence of the 
request for a “reasonable woman” instruction is reversed in two other cases I 
teach.  In the first, Eichhorn v. Missouri, K. & T. Railway Co.,25 the plaintiff 
(“a strong, healthy Norwegian woman”26) was injured attempting to board one 
of defendant’s trains, which required passengers to step up two-and-a-half or 
three feet.  The plaintiff alleged, and the jury agreed, that the defendant was 
negligent for failing to provide a platform or stepstool.  The trial court 
instructed the jury regarding the definition of both negligence and contributory 
negligence “‘that the words “carelessly,” “negligently,” and “negligence,” used 
in the instruction, mean the lack of such care and caution as reasonable and 
prudent men would exercise under like circumstances.’”27  In addition, at the 
request of the defendant, the court described contributory negligence as “‘the 
plaintiff’s failure or neglect to exercise such care, caution, and foresight as a 
woman of ordinary care, caution, and foresight would have exercised under the 
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time. . . .’”28  The Missouri 
Supreme Court upheld the verdict, affirming both the jury finding of 
negligence and of no contributory negligence.  With respect to contributory 
negligence, it dismissed the defendants’ claim of error nearly out of hand: 
As to the criticism of the court’s instructions because it defined negligence 
[including contributory negligence] to mean the lack of such care and caution 
as reasonable and prudent “men” would exercise under like circumstances, 
instead of “women,” it is only necessary to say the defendant’s own instruction 
 
 24. See Schlanger, Injured Women, supra note 4, at 110-11 n.114; id. at 139; Scott, supra 
note 12, at 33 (critiquing “long traditions of (Western) philosophy that have systematically and 
repeatedly construed the world hierarchically in terms of masculine universals and feminine 
specificities”). 
 25. 32 S.W. 993 (Mo. 1895).  Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender and the 
Law of Accidental Injury, 1870–1920, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 369, 383-86 (1994), presents 
interesting information about this case gathered from the trial record. 
 26. Eichhorn, 32 S.W. at 995. 
 27. Id. at 995 (quoting the trial court) (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. at 996 (quoting the trial court). 
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cured this defect, if any; but the jury would have been utterly unfit to try any 
case if they did not understand that “men,” in this instruction, was generic, and 
embraced “women.”29 
Another similar case raises the same issue.  In Asbury v. Charlotte Electric 
Railway, Light & Power Co.30 the plaintiff was injured attempting to get off a 
streetcar.  The trial court charged the jury that “due care” meant “‘such care as 
an ordinarily prudent man, placed in circumstances like or similar to those in 
which the person whose conduct is in question was placed, would use.’”31  The 
defendant objected that 
the care to be exercised by a woman, when she is placed in a dangerous 
position, would be greater than that required of a man surrounded by the same 
circumstances; that she is supposed to be less able to take care of herself than 
is a man, and the danger to her will therefore be greater; that, when this is the 
case (that is, when the danger is greater), the law requires a greater degree of 
care to be exercised in avoiding it.32 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the argument: “There is nothing 
in [the precedent defendant cites] which even squints toward a holding that a 
woman is not bound by the rule of ‘the prudent man,’ but ordinarily by a 
stricter rule.”33 
Thus in Eichhorn and Asbury it is the defendant rather than the plaintiff 
who wants a “reasonable woman” instruction.34  The theory is simple.  Where 
Daniels and Tucker are about “care” as “skill,” Eichhorn and Asbury are about 
“care” as “caution”; the railways’ thinking is that women, less mobile, athletic, 
etc.35 than men, should be more careful to compensate—and that the (male) 
jury will, if signaled by reference to feminine language that it should, impose 
this extra burden as a requirement of reasonable care.  The cases’ posture is 
actually a fairly common one in this fairly common kind of accident.  That is, 
far from privileging (though in a potentially double-edged way) women’s 
position or perspective, a “reasonable woman” standard, notwithstanding its 
 
 29. Id. at 997. 
 30. 34 S.E. 654 (N.C. 1899). 
 31. Id. at 657 (quoting the trial court). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. It is this position-swap that makes these “reasonable woman” cases more interesting to 
teach, for me, than the oft-made argument that sexual harassment law, for example, should direct 
juries to use a feminized standard to decide if a given course of conduct amounts to actionable 
harassment.  See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: 
THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000). 
 35. In these boarding and disembarking cases, female gender increased the risk of accidental 
injury because of women’s clothing (long skirts, corsets, and, often, high heels) and frequent 
pregnancy.  A strong sense of the fragility of female reproductive health probably contributed, as 
well.  See Schlanger, Injured Women, supra note 4, at 114-15 and sources cited. 
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rhetorical appeal, frequently enforces as well as reflects a masculine vision of 
female dependence and fragility.  Eichhorn and Asbury lead some students to 
flip-flop from their earlier position: where some had argued that the Daniels 
court was correct to make allowances for women’s lesser driving skill, they are 
far less happy with court-enforced super-caution.  We explore whether these 
positions are compatible in a principled way. 
C. Bad driving, again: noble horses, men of ordinary prudence, and timid 
women. 
I will end this brief essay with my favorite case in this series, Fox v. Town 
of Glastenbury.36  The plaintiff’s decedent was drowned when, accompanied 
by another woman, she drove her wagon over a bridge onto a (tortiously 
dangerous) causeway that was submerged.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut 
vacated a jury verdict for the plaintiff, finding contributory negligence as a 
matter of law: 
[W]hen, after they had entered the water west of the bridge, their horse, true to 
the instincts of his noble nature, faltered, and stood still, they should have 
heeded his kindly admonition, and there waited for assistance and deliverance, 
instead of forcing the animal forward to his fate.  The boat, by means of which 
one of them was rescued, with two boys in it, was sailing close at hand; a 
wagon, with two men in it, was approaching the causeway from the west. . . . 
Their outcry would have brought almost immediate relief. . . . We are not 
unmindful of the fact urged upon our attention by the plaintiff’s counsel, that 
these travelers were females.  And in that fact, and in the timidity, 
inexperience, and want of skill which it implies, we can find an explanation of 
their injudicious and fatal attempt to turn around in the water, but no reason or 
excuse for the recklessness of their conduct in driving into it. . . . [I]f men of 
ordinary prudence and discretion would regard the ability of the party 
inadequate for the purpose, without hazard or danger, the risk should not be 
assumed. . . .37 
The Fox opinion is good fodder for continuing conversation about the 
language of judicial opinions: I assign it because its rhetoric and its announced 
standard line up so well.  The noble horse, the nearby boys, and the jury all 
share the masculine ability to assess and cope with risk.  And, says the court, if 
masculine discretion deems feminine ability “inadequate” for some purpose, 
that assessment packs the power of law. 
My class on “reasonable women” gives students a chance to explore the 
interaction of law and social norms in a doctrinal context that grips them more 
directly than many.  It reveals that doctrinal implementation of an ideal of 
equality between the sexes is more complicated than most of them would have 
 
 36. 29 Conn. 204 (1860). 
 37. Id. at 208-09. 
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thought.  I hope that it helps to counter the alienation some law students report 
is caused by law school classes’ facade of “perspectivelessness,”38 by 
authorizing students to attend to both male and female perspectives, for the day 
and thereafter.  And it reinforces the value of close attention to judicial 
language.  All in all a worthwhile day, I think. 
 
 
 38. Cf. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race Conscious Pedagogy in 
Legal Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989). 
